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INCOMPLETE PRIVATISATION AND THE POROSITY OF PUBLIC VALUES 
Handling discrepancies between public values and privatised services, avoiding 
reverse privatisation. 
 
Paper for the Public values session, NIG conference November 8, 2007 
Michiel A. Heldeweg (Twente University, LEGS department)1 
 
 
This paper presents an attempt at a legal approach to addressing wrongful privatisations, 
avoiding reverse privatisation or even re-publitisation as answers to (unavoidable) 
negative discrepancies between public values and related public services. 
In no. 58 of the paper a short overview of the steps from the  leading question to the 
concluding remarks is presented. 
This paper is still in the draft stages as especially footnotes and cases have not yet been 
fully elaborated, let alone finalised. This should not handicap the NIG debate of the 8th of 
November 2007. If, however, these shortcomings somehow do disturb reading, the 
author wishes to apologise sincerely for the inconvenience.  
 
 
I. Introduction: discrepancies 
 
1. Once privatisation of the production or delivery of public goods or services, such as 
energy, public transport or health care (hereafter the ‘delivery of public services’), has 
been realised, in the sense of a transfer of property rights in the organisation of these 
services to the market, a discrepancy may unveil itself between the desired and the 
actual realisation of public values involved.  
Public values are taken here to be translated into: type and specific technical 
characteristics of the public services involved, such as with regard to its nature, and for 
example its frequency or the tariffs of this service (hereafter the ‘public quality’); to 
organisation of these services, such as requirements regarding, labour conditions, and 
sustainability of the private producers or suppliers involved, as well as the social 
acceptance of the (social) cost of privatisation (hereafter the ‘public organisation’) and to 
conditions regarding the interaction between the new, private producer or supplier and 
the new consumers, as in equal treatment or fair play,2 and the relations with third 
parties, as in public openness (hereafter the ‘public interaction’).    
Discrepancy is taken to relate to (on the one hand) desires and expectations of 
government with regard to public quality, public organisation and public interaction and 
(on the other hand) the actual public quality, public organisation and public interaction as 
realised in practise. This discrepancy may be positive or negative, in terms of improving 
on public values or placing a burden on them. This paper is only about negative 
discrepancies (hereafter, discrepancies). Furthermore, discrepancies may be of a static or 
a dynamic nature. Static discrepancies refer to given public values, regarding quality, 
organisation and interaction, that have (simply) been safeguarded or enforced poorly, 
thus creating a chance at a discrepancy between expectations and the actual facts – 
where public quality organisation and interaction may be found wanting. Dynamic 
discrepancies refer to the possibility of a change in views concerning relevant public 
values with the result that the actual public quality, organisation and interaction may be 
up to previous standards but not to the most recent desires in terms of new parameters.3  
 
                                                
1 Michiel A. Heldeweg is an associate professor of Constitutional and Administrative Law at the Faculty of 
Management & Governance at the University of Twente. http://www.mb.utwente.nl/legs/staff/heldeweg/  
2 Both these examples relate to Dutch legal principles of proper administration, valid in administrative decisions 
vis-à-vis citizens.  Legal protection may also be regarded as a matter of public performance. 
3 An in-between category of discrepancy may be that public values have (as it turns out) been poorly described 
and in practise lead to a discrepancy in views on their interpretation – which may be brought under a fallacy in 
safeguarding (static discrepancy), but also under a silent change in views or a dynamic interpretation of vague 
terms (dynamic discrepancy). 
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2. In this paper both static and dynamic discrepancies are considered problematic and 
hence the leading question is whether there is a ‘regulatory fix’ for this phenomenon of 
discrepancies on the realisation of public values in cases of privatisation of public 
services. Both types of discrepancies are considered relevant but only to the extent of 
their regulatory appraisal, so only with regard to whether or not the values involved can 
be adequately addressed in regulation – in principle providing for all necessary means of 
actual enforcement; while enforcement as such is not part of this study. With regard to 
the problem of static discrepancy this implies that willingness and capacity to enforce is 
not addressed in this paper, but the adequacy in principle of regulatory safeguards (can 
these be adequate?) is. The same ‘adequacy in principle’, phrased above as the 
possibility of a ‘regulatory fix’, is at stake with regard to dynamic discrepancy. In the 
shadow of the regulatory fix attention is also paid to the alternative or complement of a 
‘property fix’, which means safeguarding – against static or dynamic discrepancies – by 
means of retaining property rights, such as shares. 
 
3. Firstly this paper will address some examples of (expected) discrepancies (par. II). 
Secondly (in par. III), the nature and especially the porosity of public values are 
analysed. Thirdly, the aspect of privatisation as a normative transformation is clarified (in 
par. IV) and subsequently (in par. V) the regulatory impediments that result from this 
transformation are addressed. Finally, options for a way out of discrepancy problems are 
put forward and discussed (in par. VI). Paragraph VII presents some concluding remarks. 
 
 
II. Cases of (expected) discrepancies  
 
4. The Dutch privatisation history presents some cases as interesting illustrations of the 
problem of discrepancy as raised in the introduction. In two cases the discrepancy had an 
ex post character, in that the problem surfaced after privatisation had been (partially) 
realised. Two other cases illustrate how fears for discrepancies caused an ex ante 
hesitance to fully privatise a public service.4 
 
II.1. The CEO-salaries case  
 
5. This case is about the extreme increases in salaries paid to CEO’s in privatised public 
sector activities. Important examples come from the energy, health, housing and 
educational sectors.5 Clearly, these instances gave rise to considerable political and 
public debate as it was felt, both by the public and by the Dutch cabinet, that the 
increases or amounts as such were ‘outrageous’ and not compatible with the nature of 
the public services rendered. Presumably, this view was concerned with the ‘public 
organisation’ aspect of public values related to privatisation. Organisations within this 
sector should offer salaries in keeping with the nature of the public service at large, 
putting the latter, clearly, before the aim of personal profit. This was the main point of 
critique, which also gave rise to presenting the salary of the prime minister as a limit 
standard for all wages in the public sector – even within privatised organisations.6 In the 
margin of this key point, another source of scepticism was that the presumption that 
privatisation is about creating profit or competitiveness incentives, also with respect to 
salaries, as a means to enhance services, simply does not apply as long as privatisation 
merely amounts to the creation of quasi-markets (as an oligopoly in which CEO’s have no 
real fear of a sudden loss of income or position). 
 
                                                
4 The reader who wishes to scan this paper rather than read or study (carefully), should know in advance that 
the cases are meant to illustrate the issue rather than being actual objects of research and hence knowledge of 
the cases is not essential to understanding this paper. 
5 Examples of extreme salaries yet to be included. Note that, strictly speaking, most Dutch universities have not 
been privatised but have become public independent agencies (quango’s).  
6 A difference of opinion can be traced with regard to whether or not privatised providers are financed by 
government for the services rendered or merely by transactions with ‘consumers’. PM 
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6. In response firstly a statute was introduced compelling privatised organisations to 
make their system of salaries or even specific salaries (per position) transparent and 
public. It was believed that this requirement would lead to moderation (as a mechanism 
akin to ‘naming and shaming’). Secondly, when this first response did not lead to a 
significant change in salaries, a statute was proposed that will indeed set a fixed 
maximum wage for privatised public sector organisations. (PM – the legislative narrative 
is still in needs of some elaboration.) 
 
7. This case shows how ex post, after privatisation, it became clear that public values 
with regard to the ‘public organisations’ aspect, differed from the standards for setting 
CEO-wages in practise. In part this may be a result of implicit (and in hindsight, 
incorrect) presumptions on how the CEO-salaries might develop in a privatised context 
(as mentioned in the above), but the discrepancy may also be seen as the result of a 
change in opinions regarding CEO-wages in privatised public sector organisations. 
Finally, the example shows that because of privatisation, the instruments for remediation 
of the discrepancy seemed more limited. If government still held shares in the companies 
involved, this would offer the opportunity of setting limits on a case to case basis 
(through the Board of Governors), within the companies involved. There are indications 
that this was done to some extent,7 but for some years the view was also held that 
property rights of government in private companies should be used only as an 
‘emergency brake’ where strategic discussions might endanger the certainty and 
universality of rendering the public service involved (and being able to, if necessary, 
republitise, without unacceptable cost). As to the regulatory solution problems could arise 
if putting a cap on salaries result in discriminating CEO’s in privatised companies from 
companies from other private companies. (PM-Elaborate) 
 
II.2 The Housing corporations case  
 
8. This case is relevant to our subject because it is concerned with an attempt by the 
Dutch cabinet to regain control over the capital reserves (of over 3,5 billion euros) that 
have been built up over years with the privatised housing corporations. These 
corporations have the legal form of a trust or a society and have as their sole task to 
provide for public housing. Many were established directly after the introduction of the 
Housing act of 1902, which provided for a mechanism under which private organisations 
were, under certain specific conditions (such as having the exclusive objective of 
enhancing public housing facilities), eligible for government funding for housing projects. 
Subsequently, corporations were established by, for example, Socialist/Trade union, 
Catholic and Protestant initiatives, on the communal level (‘gemeente’), sometimes 
related to housing for special groups, such as public servants, teachers, military and 
railway personnel.89  
In the course of the 1980’s and 1990’s many corporations merged, resulting in the 
present number of about 500. This wave of mergers collided with the fact that in 1993 
government decided to largely withdraw from public housing, reducing its influence on 
the sector but also its funding, requiring of the corporations to largely arrange for their 
own finances. As originally corporations were involved in building, renting out (to 
presently 2,5 million tenants) and the maintenance of social housing projects, today the 
corporations are (also) actively involved in building owner-occupied property, often as a 
means to provide for profits that can be used for other tasks, amongst which, 
increasingly, also the improvement of liveability of urban areas, also involving housing 
for special interest groups, such as elderly or handicapped citizens.10  
                                                
7 The previous Chancellor of the Exchequer, dr. Zalm, stated such in a television interview (Pauw & Witteman, 
17 October 2007). PM other sources. 
8 Presently arranged in Article 70 of the Housing Act (Woningwet). 
9 Resulting in a rise in the number of corporations – 40 in 1890, 300 in 1914 and 1341 in 1922 – see 
http://www.haagwonen.nl/info.asp?ID=73 [20.10.2007] PM- Replace with primary source. 
10 Vide (19 October 2007) 
http://www.vrom.nl/pagina.html?id=19597&ref=http://www.google.nl/search?hl=nl&sa=X&oi=spell&resnum=0
&ct=result&cd=1&q=woningcorporaties&spell=1  
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Presently the role of the corporations is regulated in the Crown order on Management of 
Rented Social Housing,11 as based on the Housing Act 1991.12 
 
9. In the late spring of 2007 the minister of Housing took up on the policy objective of 
revitalising 40 seriously degraded urban areas, by suggesting that the corporations would 
deposit their acquired capital reserves in a public fund managed by the minister (in 
amounts of 750 million euros per annum over a period of 4 years).13 The corporations 
were reluctant to comply, as they felt they themselves were best equipped to 
successfully address the problems of these 40 areas and that the proposed scheme would 
lead to considerable bureaucracy and to an undesirable redistribution of capital between 
the richer and the poorer corporations. 
In the course of the struggle, in the summer of 2007, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
interfered by threatening the corporations with a unilateral levy of 3 billion euros, so as 
to seize the necessary capital involved. In response the corporations, represented by 
their own umbrella, called Aedes, broke off their negotiations with the minister of 
Housing and suggested that an attempt to introduce the dreaded levy would be answered 
by a law suit on the basis of expropriation.  
After the summer holiday, shortly before the yearly cabinet budget was presented in 
September 2007, the minister of Housing and the corporations came to an agreement, 
which amounted to a donation by the corporations of 250 million euros per annum over a 
period of 10 years into a private investment fund, from which corporations could cheaply 
lend money for extra investments in the 40 most seriously degraded urban areas. It is 
still unclear whether the money that goes into the fund is actually going to be spend, or 
that only the rents from this fund will be spend – and with this it is also still unclear 
whether the creation of this fund (of some kind) will lead to a redistribution of capital 
from the richer corporations to the poorer ones (especially those in the aforementioned 
40 areas). Furthermore, some suggest that the idea of creating a fund was primarily 
initiated by the desires of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to meet budgetary 
requirements under the EMU-scheme. 
 
10. Clearly, this case points at the condition under which an independent organisation in 
a private legal form is put under pressure to direct its reserves to causes indicated by 
central government. Or, putting it differently, corporations were found insufficiently 
responsive to public policy objectives; a discrepancy between the public quality of 
services delivered by the corporations and the desires of the cabinet (with regard to 
neighbourhood renewal and the allocation of the corporations capital reserves – referred 
to by the Chancellor of the Exchequer as ‘public money’).14 Different to the CEO-case, the 
‘gap’ in this case should be considered as a static discrepancy, as the public interest itself 
is not in debate (in terms of new parameters of quality), but rather the way in which it is 
to be addressed. To bridge the gap, firstly a regulatory fix was sought, by means of 
negotiations towards a voluntary solution (in the form of a covenant),15 but when it 
proved impossible to voluntarily rally the corporations behind the policy targets, the 
cabinet chose to threaten the corporations with a tax seizure, in fact seeking a ‘property 
fix’, qualified by the corporations as an attempted expropriation.16 
   
                                                
11 Besluit beheer Sociale huursector, Besluit van 9 oktober 1992, houdende regels betreffende instellingen, 
werkzaam in het belang van de volkshuisvesting. OJ (Staatsblad) 1992, 555. 
12 OJ (Staatsblad) 1991, 439. 
13 This initiative was preceded under a previous cabinet by an attempt to close a covenant between the State 
(minister of Housing) and the corporations on the basis of which corporations themselves would engage in 
major investments in seriously degraded urban areas. See also NRC Handelsblad, 16 November 2007. 
14 Parliamentary documents (Kamerstukken) 3 juli 2007, PM debate on Voorjaarsnota (‘Springbudget’).  
15 Consider that Articles 41 and following of the BBHS hold an instructive competence of the minister of housing 
vis-à-vis individual corporations. [not considered ‘suitable’ here: elaborate why… PM] 
16 Shortly after the corporation’s umbrella (Aedes) and the minister of Housing did reach an agreement (on the 
private fund) the latter proposed, in a speech to the Association of supervisors to housing corporations, on 10 
October 2007, that she would pursue the competence to sack (members) of internal boards of supervisors (to 
individual corporations) in case of evident mismanagement…. (VROM 
http://www.vrom.nl/pagina.html?id=34302 [20 October 2007]. 
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II.3 The Schiphol case 
 
11. This case is interesting as it shows how the Dutch central government has been at 
odds on whether or not to privatise the Dutch (inter)national airport of Schiphol (the ‘NV 
Luchthaven Schiphol)17 in which the Dutch state holds 75,8%18 and the cities of 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam hold 21,8% and 2.4% of shares.  
The two former cabinets, ‘Balkenende II and III’,19 pushed for privatisation of Schiphol, 
by reducing government shares in NV Luchthaven Schiphol to a minimum of 51 % 
(allowing for 49% of shares to be privately owned). This was considered a desired 
scenario to enable the Schiphol management to more effectively meet competitive 
challenges and acquire additional investment capital. 
Because the Charter of Schiphol corporation requires an 80% endorsement to the 
decision to sell the state shares, it was imperative that the city of Amsterdam agreed. 
Amsterdam however, didn’t, as it felt that sales of shares would amount to a 
considerable loss of control over investment decisions (with a possible shift from 
passenger and freight transport to office buildings around the airport; and a shift to 
investing in other airports across Europe (and beyond)) and tariffs. Furthermore, 
annually Amsterdam benefits by the dividend on its shareholders position (and to sell a 
profitable airport is seen as putting ‘quick gains’ before a continuous source of income). 
Finally, the importance of being able to influence environmental performance criteria 
through the shareholder position was presented as an asset of being a major 
shareholder. 
The chancellor to the Exchequer (dr. Zalm) and the city of Amsterdam did not reach 
agreement, and subsequently Amsterdam vetoed the sales of state shares in an official 
Schiphol shareholders meeting on the 30th of September 2006. The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer announced that he would propose an annulment by the Dutch Crown 
(effectively the cabinet) of the decision by the shareholders.20 
 
12. The switch in central government in 2007 came with a change in partnership from 
Christian-democrats and (Social-)Liberals (cabinets Balkenende II and III) to a Christian-
democrats, Social-democrats and Christian-unionist (Balkenende IV) coalition, and a 
more moderate (or sceptic?) view on privatisation. In the coalition agreement the 
position was taken that the new cabinet would not seek placing state shares in Schiphol 
on the stock market, but instead to do seek others means by which capital may be 
derived from the shareholders position without diminishing shareholder control in the 
corporation.21 Then, on the 18th of October 2007, the cabinet published its decision not to 
sell its shares in Schiphol. Main consideration is that the position of Schiphol as a main 
port is related to public interests, such as the environment, and hence to ensure 
confidence with all parties concerned as to optimally safeguarding these interests, is of 
utmost importance. Given that with regard to the option of selling state shares in 
Schiphol such confidence is lacking with co-shareholders, and given that it is insufficiently 
clear that placing state shares with private parties will create advantages as to efficiency 
and to safeguarding public interests, the cabinet decided not to pursue a sale of state 
shares.22 
 
13. This case exemplifies an ex ante evaluation of the possibilities of ensuring proper 
safeguards as to public interests, more specifically concerning the Schiphol environment 
and giving priority to (investing in) services from Schiphol airport (at a reasonable price, 
                                                
17 ‘NV’ stands for Open Corporation, meaning that bearer shares in the Schiphol corporation may be traded on 
the stock market.   
18 http://www.minfin.nl/nl/onderwerpen,staatsdeelnemingen/overzicht_staatsdeelnemingen/Index.html  (20 
October 2007. 
19 May 2003 – June 2006 and July 2006 – February 2007. 
20 On the basis of Article 268 Gemeentewet Local Government Act. 
21 PM Coalition agreement February 2007. 
22 Letter by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 18 October 2007, Fin 2007-00652. The Chancellor does refer to 
support for the possibility of an arrangement for a super dividend as a means of withdrawing capital from the 
shareholder position (for new investments in Schiphol), but this remains an issue to be studied further. 
Michiel A. Heldeweg,  Incomplete privatisation (...), NIG paper October 2007 6 
and instead of elsewhere or, as far as Schiphol is concerned, in real estate rather than 
transport). Clearly co-shareholders, and also the cabinet itself have fears of a possible 
future discrepancy between desired protection or improvement of public interests and the 
realisation thereof under a regime where government has a seriously diminished 
shareholder position in Schiphol. From this it seems evident that the governmental 
bodies involved have insufficient trust in the possibilities of a regulatory arrangement to 
adequately protect and improve these public interests in this particular instance – even if 
it is considered that there were also doubts concerning efficiency improvement (for 
private corporations on the market for air traffic infrastructures) and concerning the 
timeliness of selling shares now (considering that Schiphol is doing so well and may be 
expected to continue to do so at least for a number of years). 
 
II.4 The Twence case 
 
14. Similarly, the Twence case shows ex ante hesitance with regard to safeguarding 
protection and enhancement of public interests – joined with doubts on efficiency 
improvement (‘market failure’) and wrong timing (‘quick gains’). The case is about a 
waste treatment plant in Twente, a region in the east of the Netherlands, of which the 
majority of shares is owned by the municipalities of that region.23 The Region of Twente 
is an administrative organisation for cooperation between the municipalities involved and 
has taken up on the plan to sell off the shares in the plant in order to use the capital (of 
an estimated € 2-300,000) to be invested in regional innovations, such as infrastructural 
works.24 
Remarkably and distinct from the Schiphol case, where the Schiphol management was 
very much in favour of privatisation, the directors and the Board of Governors of Twence 
are in favour of a continuation of the majority share holder position of the region (and 
prefer other means, such as paying out all profits by means of a dividend, to create the 
capital reserve needed for innovation projects).25 Furthermore, directors and governors 
think that interests of Twence and the Twente region coincide, tariffs can be kept on a 
low level, and waste treatment may be continued successfully and combined with 
providing energy and warmth from incineration of waste and aiding in the redaction of 
CO2 emissions.  
From press releases it has become clear that (members of) municipal boards are very 
much in doubt as to the timing of the sale of shares (as they expect the value of Twence 
to rise considerably in the next decade), but also because the fear that once the share 
holder position is lost, there will be insufficient safeguards as to keeping the tariffs for 
waste treatment low (as many expect that it will take a long time before true competition 
will come to exist in the business of waste treatment – if ever) or, as to making use of 
other public benefits, such as the aforementioned environmental and energy 
considerations.26 On the 11th of October 2007 the council of the Region of Twente decided 
to postpone decision making, as support on the sale of shares was considered insufficient 
to push forward. 27 Furthermore, it was announced that further research would be done 
to work out possible scenarios regarding future relations between the region and Twence, 
should the shares be sold at a later date. The outcomes of this research are expected in 
January 2008 and a definitive decision on whether to go ahead with selling shares is 
expected in spring 2008. 
                                                
23 82% of shares are owned by the municipalities belonging to the Region of Twente; 15% is owned by the 
energy company Essent and 3% by the waste treatment company Noord-Groningen. 
24  The so-called ‘Agenda for Twente’ (http://www.regiotwente.nl/en/regiotwente1/agendavantwen/). On this 
point see: http://www.regiotwente.nl/en/publicaties/persberichten/00410/ (29 October 2007) 
25 Letter by the board of Governors, 24 september 2007, 
http://www.twence.nl/shared%20resources/downloads/brief%20aan%20Twentse%20raadsleden%20inzake%2
0aandeelhouderschap%20Regio%20Twente%2024-9-2007.pdf . 
26 See press releases by the regional paper http://www.tctubantia.nl/search/index.jsp or nationally (NRC) 
http://archief.nrc.nl/?modus=l&text=twence&hit=1&set=1 and 
http://archief.nrc.nl/?modus=l&text=twence&hit=2&set=1 (all internet sources 29 October 2007) 
27 See 
http://www.regiotwente.nl/vergaderingen/regioraad/24_okt_3_Bijlage_5_Besluitvorming_inzake_belang_RT_in
_Twen___.pdf/  (29 October 2007). 
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15. This case too, presents us with ex ante hesitance as to (amongst other 
considerations) the safeguards for public interests, both concerning tariffs and 
possibilities to improve on environmental and energy interests – apart from what is 
required by law. Clearly, hesitance relates to whether a true market for waste treatment 
will come to exist, but also on the issue of avoiding discrepancies in terms of a sufficient 
effort in respect of the public values involved.  
Interestingly, the management of Twence itself is in favour of a continuation of the 
present share holder involvement of government, especially from the viewpoint of 
continuity. Possibly this, by contrast, strengthens the case that indeed a true market for 
waste treatment is on the rise and in time competition will guarantee more efficiency and 
hence even reduce tariffs – but for now one can only conjecture on this issue. 
 
 
III. The nature of public values; the porosity problem  
 
16. In the face of these cases it seems that the problem of discrepancies may be 
addressed in two ways: by avoidance ex ante and after revealing itself by remediation ex 
post. Given that the question of whether a regulatory fix is attainable is central to this 
paper, an important preliminary question is whether, also considering the cases 
described in the above (par. II), the nature of the discrepancy – static or dynamic – 
requires that the analysis is differentiated in order to not overlook the possibility of 
different ‘scenarios’ in judging the capacity to provide for regulatory solutions 
respectively for both ex ante and ex post discrepancies – as the box below graphically 
suggests on the basis of the aforementioned cases.    
 
Response Ex ante Ex post 
Nature of discrepancy 
Static: public interest 
unchanged & clear 
 
Schiphol 
Twence 
Housing corporations 
Dynamic: public interest 
unclear or changed 
CEO-salaries 
 
17. As this matrix shows, to consider a difference in scenarios regarding ex ante 
(regulatory) provisions to avoid discrepancies, does not really surface in the presentation 
of the Schiphol and Twence cases. In both cases particular public interests were 
presented as being of such importance that there was reluctance to leave their protection 
to regulation only. In more general terms however, we can not rule out the possibility 
that some public services or some public values are (by nature) more susceptible to 
change than others.  
Furthermore, as the Housing corporations and CEO-cases have been presented as 
instances of static versus dynamic discrepancies, one may wonder if this calls for 
separate analyses, possibly leading to different answers. Both cases show an attempt by 
policy-makers to redress the discrepancy by both regulatory and property responses; 
ranging from covenants, via introducing legislation, to shareholder influence and 
taxation. Whether this is an outcome that offers sufficient underpinning for the 
assumption that in the analyses of ex post cases we need not differentiate between static 
or dynamic discrepancies, is yet unclear. 
So, what is needed firstly is a clearer perspective on what is meant by static versus 
dynamic, and whether there is a difference between public services and public values in 
terms of their susceptibility to dynamics. 
 
III.1 ‘Porosity’  
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18. As to the understanding of the concepts of static and dynamic discrepancy, we may 
apply the notion of the ‘open texture’ of empirical concepts as introduced by Friedrich 
Waismann in his 1949 paper on Verifiability.28  
This open texture (or porosity)29 notion refers to: ‘The fact that (…) there is no such 
thing as a conclusive verification (which – MAH) is connected with the fact that most of 
our empirical concepts are not delimited in all possible directions’, ‘Try as we may, no 
concept is limited in such a way that there is no room for any doubt.’, ‘We tend to 
overlook the fact that there are always other directions in which the concept has not 
been defined. And if we did, we could easily imagine conditions which would necessitate 
new limitations.’30  
But we need to be careful in our definition as: ‘Vagueness should be distinguished from 
open texture.’ Vagueness refers to using a word in a ‘fluctuating way’, whereas open 
texture refers to the non-exhaustiveness or the ‘possibility of vagueness’; ‘Vagueness 
can be remedied by giving more accurate rules, open texture cannot.’, ‘I shall never 
reach a point where my description will be completed: logically speaking, it is always 
possible to extend the description by adding some detail or other. Every description 
stretches, as it were, into a horizon of open possibilities: however far I go, I shall always 
carry this horizon with me.’ 
In terms of conclusive verification of empirical statements Waismann’s analysis presents 
us with two types of incompleteness, expressed in:  
1. ‘the existence of an unlimited number of tests’ (‘… it is impossible to conclude the 
description of a material object, or of a situation.’); 
2. ‘the open texture of the terms involved’ (‘… our factual knowledge is incomplete (..): 
there is always a chance that something unforeseen may occur.’), which may mean 
two things: a. required acquaintance with ‘some totally new experience’ (unforeseen, 
as a blind man who can suddenly see) or b. ‘That some new discovery was made 
which would affect our whole interpretation of certain’ (such as the invention of 
electricity). 
 
19. In short, our definitions of empirical objects, but likewise of legal terms referring to 
values, persons, objects, processes and situations, will be incomplete (as there are 
always new characteristics we may add) and provisional (as there may always be new 
and unforeseen circumstances of experience, recognition and interpretation).31 
Vagueness, however, concerns exhaustive definitions that are merely used more freely. 
This conceptualisation may be used to clarify the formerly introduced notions of static 
and dynamic discrepancies and determine the relevance of their distinction with regard to 
a regulatory or property fix. In order to achieve clarification, however, firstly we need to 
address the typology of public values in relation to public services. 
 
III.2 Types of public values32  
 
Public values are described here as values designated by government as in need for 
protection or improvement/enhancement through certain services (as defined in par. I). 
 
20. This description presumes a primacy of government over determination of values as 
public values (more than merely societal or collective values).33 This reflects the premise 
or legal axiom of a systemic responsibility of government for safeguarding and/or the 
                                                
28 F. Waismann, Verifiability, Originally published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 
Volume XIX (1945); Reprinted version in Antony Flew, ed., Logic and Language, the First Series (1951). See 
http://www.ditext.com/waismann/verifiability.html (21 October 2007). 
29 See the second footnote in Waismann’s article. 
30 Citations from this article in this subparagraph are shown in Italics and go without specific page reference as 
the available text is not fixed in pagenumbers.  PM. 
30 See the second footnote in Waismann’s article. 
31 The provisionality is to Waismann the core problem of porosity (p. 124 original edition). 
32 Public values are divided into: types of public goods and services and types of legal conditions under which 
public goods and services are delivered. 
33 Reference to lists as presented in Public Values workshop NIG 06. PM 
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realisation of these values through public services under certain conditions.34 This paper 
focuses on cases of realisation through privatised organisations or agencies, within the 
context where government retains the aforementioned final- or system-responsibility;35 
government still holds the power to change the rules of the game (or governance 
structure) or indeed the general determination or definition of public values involved, but 
the existing governance structure is designed to keep government outside the game as it 
is played – apart from safeguarding the rules by supervision and sanctioning.36   
The mere existence of systemic responsibility for specified public values brings with it 
that privatisation does not turn the services involved into mere private services; these 
will remain services in the public interest (in short ‘public services’), regardless of their 
production or delivery being privatised. For government the drawback of this is that when 
a (fear of a) discrepancy arises, government can not escape responsibility.37 
 
21. As was proposed in the first paragraph public values may pertain to: 
• the ‘public quality’, which entailed both type and technical characteristics of the public 
services involved, such as with regard to its nature, and, for example, the frequency 
of its delivery and the related tariffs.  
On a closer look this description includes two aspects that may or may not always be 
easily distinguishable.  
On the one hand the typology dominates in terms of the essential match between the 
public value as a desire for protection or enhancement of a public interest (such as 
defence, safety, judicial review, energy, transport, telecommunication, and fair trade) 
– in the more abstract sense in which such values are often found in leading 
considerations preceding the Articles of a statute, or as they may be phrased in the 
wording in an Article attributing a regulatory power with regard to this value to some 
public body or office. Often this is a deliberatively vague notion, requiring further 
elaboration.  
This elaboration takes shape in specific technical characteristics of the service which 
should match the ‘desired public value’, in terms of its intrinsic characteristics, 
described in quality parameters (with corresponding standards or requirements, 
sometimes with numerical and exhaustive, non-porous(!) precision). These intrinsic 
characteristics are typical to the particular service, and are described in the technical 
properties of the service (as in voltages, time, distance, number, frequency and size 
of deliveries, and calculated risk) in as much is considered necessary to ensure that 
the desired value is – at heart – matched, also considering the need to meet other 
public values, such as those that rest in environmental interests.38 The public quality 
is also a measure or how different public values (rooted in different interests) are 
weighed against each other. 
Typology and characteristics both are intrinsic qualitative enunciations of the public 
value – public service translation.39 As such they should be positioned as a category 
apart from the extrinsic enunciations of this translation, which goes beyond the 
determination of the required public service, and takes its public quality as a given, 
by focussing only on the translation in terms of ‘the way in which, or the conditions 
under which’, with all the values and corresponding criteria connected hitherto, and 
                                                
34 Axiom in the sense of a declarative legal act by which government makes this interest its responsibility. 
35 Opposite to ‘systemic responsibility’ there is specific or operational responsibility, which is based on specific 
powers to influence operational activities. 
36 Which may also be something that is privatised – often in practice we find that government does claim 
certain powers of instruction (as on tariffs and permits & concessions for access to markets) and hence it 
carries a more operational or specific responsibility (congruent with these powers).  
37 Note that the legislative proposal on CEO-salaries refers to a certain set of organisations that are considered 
as public services organisations. The match between this list and the determination of public values is not 
researched here. (PM: legal persons with a lagal task (RWT’s) or the public subsidy criterion). 
http://www.regering.nl/Actueel/Persberichten_ministerraad/2007/september/21/Ministerraad_akkoord_met_ni
euwe_beloningsstructuur_publieke_sector ). 
38 Note that interests are regarded as perceived (individual or collective) needs, whereas values are understood 
as (morally, socially, politically or legally) acknowledged needs (as a basis to a – moral, social, political or legal 
– claim or duty). 
39 As to which they reflect at least the ‘minimum’ or ‘essential content’ of (understanding) this translation. 
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which we will name  public performance, which encompasses the two aspects as 
mentioned in the first paragraph:  
• organisation of these services, illustrated in par. 1 by requirements regarding labour 
conditions (including certainty, payment, safety and voice)40 and (economic and 
ecologic) sustainable activity of the private producers or suppliers involved; in short: 
the ‘public organisation’. In referring to other public values, it needs to be understood 
that these now relate (not to the service itself – in terms of transactions with the 
party personifying the desired value41 - but) to the internal management of the 
organisation that delivers the services and its overall strategy (possibly also regarding 
other services or transactions). On a different level, ‘organisation’ may also be 
understood to refer to the economic or societal cost of the privatised system as a 
whole, compared to alternative governance structures, such as rendering public 
services through public offices; 
• relational conditions regarding the interaction between the new, private producer or 
supplier and the new consumers (as in equal treatment or fair play), and the relations 
with third parties; in short: the ‘public interaction’. The ‘interactional’ public values 
are primarily rooted in general views concerning legal conditions with regard to an 
organisation involved in delivering public services and its outside world, both in terms 
of the public at large, public organisations, private organisations and individuals 
(citizens, consumers and third parties under external effects of transactions in the 
public service).42 Apart from general principles of private law, which will be applicable 
when public services are rendered by private law transactions (such as contracts) 
public law principles may apply, such as on public accountability, taking account of 
stakeholders interests, dispute settlement procedures or on the aforementioned 
principles of ‘proper administration’.     
 
22. It is proposed here to distinguish intrinsic values (public quality; regarding type and 
characteristics of services) and extrinsic values (public performance; regarding service 
organisation and interaction). The intrinsic aspect relates to the government primacy 
over determining the general interest by acknowledging specific public values and 
weighing them against each other. This is a responsibility characteristic to government. 
In legal terms the determination transforms collective interests into a legal duties of care 
by government – at least in terms of a systemic responsibility –, a duty that apart from 
its positive element (to protect or improve…) also has a negative element (not to invade 
on other public values).43 The extrinsic aspect builds on this determination of the public 
value and connected services, by setting the basic rules for the realisation of these 
services; basic rules which are accommodated to the governance structure chosen as a 
mode of realisation. Setting these ‘rules of the game’, as in privatisation, is also primarily 
a responsibility of government, but now other public values do not delineate, let alone 
restrict the quality of realisation of the underlying public value, but merely mould the 
way in which a service is rendered. Putting it another way: the extrinsic aspect is about 
the ‘price’ to pay, not about the ‘product’ itself.  
 
23. It is interesting to see how the above value-translations compare to other appraisals. 
Concerning public services in network infrastructures (such as energy, drinking water, 
telecommunications and public transport) the Dutch cabinet pointed at 5 general public 
values: a. universal service (certain services need to be available to all for about the 
same price); b. protecting ‘tied costumers’ (those who can not choose their supplier need 
                                                
40 ‘Certainty’ refers to, for example, the legal protection of a workforce in the course of privatisation, but also, 
after privatisation, in the course of contracting out for public services (procurement; as for example in recent 
years in The Netherlands in municipal household care and regional public transport). ‘Voice’ refers to 
mechanisms for employees influence on company decisions or accountability of the employer to a 
representation of employees. 
41 Such as the patient in a heath care treatment, the offender caught by the police, a public office in an 
infrastructure tender, and the inhabitants of an area below sea level protected by dikes.  
42 The latter refers to distributive inequalities, which in administrative law relates to the principle of égalité 
devant les charges publiques. PM  
43 The latter of which limits the powers of interference by government on private liberties. 
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protection against monopolistic treatment); c. certainty of continued delivery (a sufficient 
level of robustness or resilience of delivery (even) in cases of unforeseen events); d. 
safeguarding qualitative, environmental, safety and health requirements (no breach 
prescribed standards involving these public interests); e. efficiency of the market and fair 
trade supervision (both the costs of delivering network services and of supervisory 
activities over fair trade shouldn’t exceed socially accepted standards).44 These five 
public values for network services may be compared with the above four categories of 
two intrinsic and two extrinsic types of value-translations.  
• ‘universality’ (a) and ‘protecting tied customers’ (b) may be taken to relate to 
interactive values, in terms of distributive justice and equality. As far as the latter is 
concerned there may also be a relationship with qualitative values in the sense that a 
service should provide, for all customers in a minimum package;45 
• ‘continuity’ (c) refers to ‘organisation’, as a primordial requirement to arrive at ‘public 
quality’ (is the organisation economically viable and resilient to ‘breakdowns’?); 
• ‘safeguarding’ (d) immediately concerns the public quality of public service (in as far 
as the safeguards directly refer to the delivery of service  - for else the organisational 
values may be at stake. 
• ‘efficiency’ (e) may be taken to relate especially to ‘organisation’ in terms of the 
collective efficiency of the very governance structure that has arise on the basis of 
privatisation – a requirement that may also have a dynamic aspect in the sense of 
privatisation being more conducive to innovation.46   
 
III.3 Perspective 
 
24. So what does this categorisation amount to? Clearly, different categorisations reflect 
a different perspective or angle. The above public values for networks seem to be 
triggered primarily by the fear for a monopolistic asymmetry between private parties – 
with the ‘safeguarding clause’ as a ragbag of moral constraints, which voice a fear that 
government should, apart from taming the (monopolist ‘beast’ within), let the protection 
of other, generally accepted public values slip. Or perhaps even expressing the fear that 
general regulatory safeguards may not suffice and protection should be sought from 
within: in rules specifically linked to the governance structure as such, as in property 
safeguards (through shares in companies that have been allowed to render public 
services) – as we saw in both the Schiphol and Twence case. 
 
25. The classification in terms of intrinsic and extrinsic values (or rather enunciations of 
the desired public values – public services translation), takes the angle of determining 
the public quality as against the public performance, with the aim of more clearly 
delineating decisions in terms of the id quod and the modus quo distinction: which public 
services are required, given certain desired public values, and how should these services 
be delivered. On this basis – hopefully – the debate on static or dynamic discrepancies 
may be more clearly addressed. 
 
26. Both the enunciations for quality and for performance may be porous – in terms of 
incompletely and provisionally defined. The stance taken in this paper is that privatisation 
decisions are always incomplete, either because of omissions (causing static 
discrepancies – which may also rise because of vagueness) or because of unforeseen 
circumstances or newly formed opinions (causing dynamic discrepancies).  
                                                
44 Parliamentary documentation (Tweede Kamer), 1999-2000, 27018, Liberalisering en privatisering in 
netwerksectoren, nr. 1, Publieke belangen en marktordening (notitie), par. 2. 
45 In which case all customers are considered as ‘tied’, which is often true for those networks that do not allow 
competition within, but only competition on being granted the right to be the sole provider through the network 
(for a given period); these ‘monopolist networks’ often are monopolist also in the sense that there are no 
alternative or substitute networks (as in electricity against gas) – then all customers are tied to services from 
this network.   
46 NYFER 2003, Publieke belangen in private handen, p. 53 (met verwijzing naar Nyfer, 2000: Regulation versus 
Innovation.) See http://www.nyfer.nl/HTML/index.html .  
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So, Waismann’s conceptualisation translates in static discrepancies referring to 
vagueness (parameters are determined exclusively, but may not be sufficiently precise) 
or to incompleteness in the sense of limited criteria (or ‘tests’; some parameters have 
been described, but the list may be elaborated with other parameters for given types of 
services) and dynamic discrepancies referring to incompleteness in terms of ‘open 
texture’ (as new types of services, through technological breakthroughs, or new public 
values or a re-determination, through new policy objectives, emerge). 
 
27. Discrepancies are always ex post phenomena, as they appear after privatisation. But 
the chances at such discrepancies should trigger ex ante awareness and safeguards. 
These safeguards may be found in regulatory or property provisions, but it should be 
understood that the ability or room to apply or invoke such provisions may differ 
considerably in terms of whether they are employed before or after privatisation. An ex 
ante provision may prevent discrepancies or, if not (because incompleteness is 
unavoidable!), may make the use of these provisions, given their embeddedness in the 
‘rules of the game’, an acceptable intervention. Ex post interventions that do not rest on 
provisions as included in rules of the game, have the disadvantage of being ‘after the 
fact’ and being less easily accepted and hence more costly or less successful – which is 
caused by the phenomenon of normative transformation, which is discussed in the next 
paragraph.  
 
 
IV. Privatisation as a normative transformation and the normative lock-in  
 
28. All in all our focus lies with ex ante safeguards to enable ex post solutions for (static 
or dynamic, but certainly unavoidable) discrepancies. Our primary quest is to determine 
if a regulatory fix is possible which allows government to live up to its intention in 
privatisation, namely to limit its involvement to system-responsibility. Where a 
regulatory fix falls short, the property fix emerges, but the cost may be that privatisation 
is fundamentally hampered.47 
 
IV.1 Normative transformation 
 
29. Privatisation is a normative transformation. This transformation is twofold.  
Firstly, the delivery of public services is left to private parties, and as a consequence 
transactions concerning the particular services become market transactions, in a 
contractual form. This contractual form may reflect perfectly horizontal delivery of 
services, as in public utilities, but may also relate to the exercise of a public competence, 
as in an M.O.T.-test (vehicle inspection), were the decision on approval remains a 
unilateral one. Furthermore, privatisation may lead to liberalisation, in which there is a 
market for the public services concerned and more than one ‘provider’ compete. In 
privatisation without liberalisation, transactions may take shape in contracts, but these 
are ‘flawed’ in the sense that the only freedom that the ‘client’ has is to decide whether 
or not to enter into a contract. In privatisation with liberalisation, economically speaking 
there are ‘open contracts’, to the extent that the price becomes a matter of negotiation 
or at least of competitive setting. 
 
30. Secondly, privatisation amounts to a transfer in property rights in the provider. The 
ownership of the providing organisation is transferred to the market in the sense of 
private parties on the market. In full privatisation all shares rest with private actors, but 
hybrid privatisation, in which government still retains some shares, is a well known 
feature. The hybrid constellation may be a choice for transitory reasons. Often 
privatisation is a first step to liberalisation, but government is not willing to immediately 
engage in the assumption that a market for public services will emerge and that public 
                                                
47 The view is taken that privatisation relates to a transfer of the property rights in the organisation of the 
public service. 
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values are properly safeguarded through regulation. Hence some shares remain 
government owned – at least 49 or 50+%, or possibly less but as golden shares, nominal 
but with the possibility to outvote other share holders – to provide for an ‘emergency 
brake’ should undesired discrepancies arise. The property safeguard is then a fix for a, 
hopefully temporary, incompleteness of privatisation arrangements.48  
The transfer of property rights, to whatever extent, is important particularly for two 
reasons: control over the operations of the organisation (especially strategically)49 and a 
claim on residual and presumptive rights. 
• The first point, control over operations, is relevant to be able to strategically direct 
the firm to more profitable or otherwise more desired areas and hence increase on 
shareholder or other values. Some years ago the ruling view on this point seemed to 
be that as long as there was sufficient trust in the workings of the market, or a 
market could if necessary be construed – as through a government tender for, say, 
regional public transport (even in areas with low population density) – privately 
owned companies would respond to a market for public services and there need not 
be a fear for continuity of services. In the last few years some worries have surfaced 
as hedge-funds and large foreign state owned companies (especially from China and 
Russia) (legally) seized control over companies involved in public services.50 To, 
especially, ensure continuity it has again become an issue if to retain property rights 
as a means of safeguarding continuity (and other public values involved).51 
• The second point refers to the fact that private parties have acquired property rights 
in the providing organisation (such as energy or telecom companies) and – normally - 
these rights include a claim to residual rights over the exploitation of the property; 
that is over the benefits which remain once all production and transaction costs are 
subtracted from the incomes of delivering services.5253 Furthermore, property rights 
may, assuming that they are held in organisational assets that may be regarded as 
an economic resource, include so-called ‘presumptive rights’. These, according to 
Demsetz, amount to: ‘(….) control of yet unarticulated rights. Presumptiveness is 
necessary because the virtual infinity of rights makes present knowledge of all 
possible rights impossible. The person or group deemed to be owner of an asset is 
presumed to exercise as yet unspecified rights when there is occasion to acknowledge 
them.’54 In essence this notion reflects incompleteness in defining (the bundle of 
rights to control) a property. In practise it may mean that ownership of an 
infrastructure or network will include the right to newly discovered uses.55 Clearly the 
possibility of laying claim to presumptive rights may be both a trigger to innovation 
and to willingness of private parties to invest in providing organisations. Furthermore,  
presumptive rights may pose a threat as a privatised provider may decide to focus his 
organisation more on providing for private services, even as his organisational assets 
were meant primarily for public services, which may be hived off or neglected.56 
 
31. The essential point behind these descriptive remarks is that privatisation is a 
normative transformation, through the introduction of new legal relationships, in the 
                                                
48 Note that these may relate to either the matter of fair trade or to the protection of (other) public values (such 
as universal service.  
49 Shareholders primarily have a say in mission and strategy, but also in key decisions such as management 
appointments. Hence indirectly there may be a strong operational influence, certainly if there is a majority 
shareholder. 
50 PM Interview Mandelson in Handelsblatt 22 July 2007 
(http://www.handelsblatt.com/news/Politik/International/_pv/_p/200051/_t/ft/_b/1297815/default.aspx/eu-
erwaegt-goldene-aktien-gegen-staatsfonds.html) and statement Commission on reciprocity (PM). 
51 On the basis of Article 56 of the EC Treaty States need be careful so as not to distort the free flow of capital 
as a result of taking ‘golden shares’ or a majority share-holder position in private enterprises. Article 86 of this 
Treaty does, however, offer some room as to Services of General Interest.  
52 PM On residual rights.. 
53 Arguably privatisation could also refer to the ownership of public rights, but this category is not addressed in 
this paper.    
54 Demsetz 1998, 145/6.  
55 Taking account for possible negative externalities. 
56 The fears expressed in the Schiphol case fit with this scenario. PM – other examples. 
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shape of contracts between private parties, and through the introduction of private 
property rights in public services organisations (and their assets). Thus privatisation 
presents us with a shift to another legal governance structure, namely that of private or 
civil law. Civil law in turn has its own leading legal principles and with regard to property 
rights, generally national legal orders have a specific regime for protection against 
‘regulatory takings’ or ‘eminent domain’ (expropriation in the general interest).57 
 
IV.2 Normative lock-in 
 
32. As the normative transformation is deliberately sought – for the symmetry of open 
contracts and the creation of private property to incite competitiveness and hence to 
reach higher efficiency, quality and effectiveness58 - at the same time public services 
(organisation and transactions) are placed in a different legal arena. Because this arena 
is different, the aspired advantages of privatisation stand a chance of being realised, but 
at the same time, the complex of legal incentives and safeguards that make up the 
normative core of this arena, creates a barrier against interventions from other legal 
arena’s, such as that of public law. The public law arena holds powers and safeguards 
concerning unilateral legal interventions (regulations, orders, acts, etc.), but to interfere 
in ‘privatised operations’ in the private law arena has two sides to it: 
a. interference that infringes in civil law rights may be restricted or come with a special 
price tag, and  
b. interference with the workings of the civil law arena may well disturb or even curb 
trust in the inner workings of its system and reduce or even paralyse the incentives it 
holds. 
 
33. Both points amount to what may be described as a normative lock-in, as normative 
transformation, through privatisation, reduces or hampers possibilities for remediation of 
(privatisation) discrepancies. Apart from possible disincentives of government 
interference, the regulatory discretion of government will be (more) limited, both in 
terms of: 
c. the legal determination of the public quality (of services) involved, and 
d. with regard to setting the legal conditions for public performance (for delivery).  
Phrased in economic terms, the normative transformation causes an increase in 
government legal (and most likely monetary) transaction costs with regard to amending 
(privatisation) discrepancies. 
 
This ‘hypothesis’ is in (serious) need of some evidence relating to the (immediately) 
above points a to d.. We will first address c and d and then a. and b. 
 
34. As to c. (determination of quality), the Housing corporations case gave an example 
of this in that government decided to push for different or more radically pursued 
priorities then the corporations aimed for. Clearly government may at some point after 
privatisation decide that different types of services should be added to the package – for 
instance on the basis of the decision that it is a public values that all citizens have an 
internet connection or UMTS available (across the country). Furthermore, specifications 
could be considered by government to be lacking, as for example a stricter standard is 
required for ambulance services in emergencies.  
To call for these quality standards may be presented as to require for something that 
may be taken to already be included in the privatised package, under the assumption 
that they are implicitly there, either from the outset or as a logical possibility as new 
technologies allow delivery – clearly, this will relate to a vagueness of conditions in the 
privatisation or willingness to apply the argument of analogy (if those, than why not also 
                                                
57 Explicate examples – as on the basis of Article 14 of the Dutch constitution. 
58 Apart from ideological reasons, such as, simply, to keep government out of affairs that – within boundaries – 
private persons should be able to deal with by themselves. 
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these similar services – perhaps with a hint as to the cost-effectiveness).59 The 
alternative would be that there is agreement that government is asking for extras, but 
nevertheless government is of the opinion that the privatised providers should adjust to 
the public desires even at a certain cost – considering that these are not 
disproportionate.60  
 
35. As to d. (setting performance standards), the argument is fairly similar as again 
government may require of privatised providers that they adjust their organisation or  
their modus operandi vis-à-vis the customers in a way which leads to more production 
costs (as in better labour conditions or in more or more frequent services) or more 
transaction costs (as, for example, government requires that a more diligent treatment 
of costumers, such as by introducing complaints procedures, is necessary).61 New 
performance standards could also involve a loss in opportunities, as for instance 
restrictions are introduced with regard to CEO-salaries (which may lead to a lesser 
quality in management)62 or if certain (more) profitable (private) services are prohibited 
(for example because they are considered incompatible with delivering public services).63  
Again, all these issues may rise as: a. presumed or implied standards (already included 
in or analogous to existing standards – and merely brought to the fore); b. new 
standards due to technological innovation; c. new standards due to new political views on 
involved public values. 
 
36. As to a. (infringement on civil law rights), The image of arena’s, as used in the 
above, is somewhat artificial, or should, if we do want to stick with it, be expanded to the 
image of an Olympic or athletic stadium in which different arenas or activities are 
interlocked or overflow. Public law and private law may have different core values, forms 
and institutions, but generally there are overlaps and interconnections.  
To start with, many legal systems accept that governments may act also as a private law 
party, and this opens up the possibility of using contract law as a means for making the 
desired adjustments to overcome discrepancies (in which government pays to get the 
extra’s into the service package). However, there are important limitations to this. 
Firstly, contracts may be most fitting with the civil law arena, but they cannot serve to 
compel, as they rest on mutual agreement.64 Secondly, in many legal systems the use of 
private law legal acts (such as a contract) by government is subject to restrictions, such 
as: a. that this use is not allowed if it conflicts with the possible use of available public 
law instruments;65 b. that this use is explicitly regulated on grounds of public values 
(such as in tender procedures, in view of fair trade);66 c. that this use is subject to 
general principles of public law, such as the equality principle and the good faith 
principle.  
                                                
59 As to costs the argument may be to simply add or alter a service at the providers cost (of introduction and 
delivery) or to add or alter and then let the customer decide whether to use and if to use, to pay.  
60 Similar as to how government may by regulation put a(n extra) burden on citizens (tax or otherwise) and not 
be obliged to compensate unless the burden is disproportionately divided among citizens – see more under no. 
56 (‘as to a’).   
61 Mind that extra requirements in provider – costumer or employer – employee relations could also result from 
court law. 
62 If indeed the argument holds true that there (still) is symmetry between wages and performance, (even) 
above the level of top government salaries. 
63 Mostly because of considerations of fair trade, such as with saving costs by using an infrastructure paid for by 
public services, or using information gathered through public service.  
64 Of course sometimes contracts or covenants are ‘agreed’ upon in the shadow of legislation (i.e. the threat 
that if the private party does not go along, the legislator will unilaterally introduce a less favourable 
arrangement – this falls under the option that will follow suit in the main text. 
65 This is known in the Netherlands as the 2-Lane doctrine (Twee-wegenleer; the 2 lanes being those of public 
and of private law, leading to a certain policy target). The underlying consideration is that these public law 
instruments are there for a reason, generally because the legislator considered them the best option (and 
safeguard) to reach certain public objectives. 
66 See the EC public services/procurement directives: Directive 2004/18/EC of 31 March 2004 on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service 
contracts, OJ(2004) L 134 and  Directive 2004/17/EC of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, OJ(2004) L 134. 
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Furthermore, if public law instruments are used to unilaterally bring about the desired 
changes several limitations may apply, firstly concerning competence itself (no. 37) and 
secondly concerning infringement on private wealth or property rights (no. 38). 
 
38. With regard to a lack of or limitations to competence, we should consider that the 
notions of ‘sovereignty of parliament’ or the ‘sovereign’ legislator’ will, in most legal 
systems, provide for sufficient underpinning to ultimately ensure that discrepancies may 
be adjusted. As far as lower regulators,67 this may well be different as, generally, they 
rely for there competences on what powers the legislator has previously bestowed upon 
them (in general terms or when a specific privatisation arrangement was introduced by 
statute) – and so it remains to be seen whether a regulator that wishes to intervene does 
indeed hold sufficient powers.68  
More importantly and concerning both legislator and lower regulators, fundamental 
(human) rights may restrict powers, either absolutely (as in discriminating – negatively – 
between races or in introducing a permit system for the freedom of speech) or relatively, 
by giving substantive or procedural conditions under which a limitation of these rights 
may be allowed (by exception). These conditions will be prohibitive in that if they are not 
met, the limitation is invalid, and they may also entail that a limitation is allowed only if, 
apart from being in tune with other requirements, proper compensation is provided for. 
Clearly, the case of eminent domain provides an example, as generally expropriation is 
possible only in certain cases (involving the public interest), through an official procedure 
(possibly through a court) and under condition of paying damages. 
 
39. Next point under possible infringement on civil law rights concerns damaging private 
wealth or property rights. Assuming that the power of unilateral interference is in 
principle provided for, we should consider especially that,69 if this intervention infringes 
on individual wealth, it may come with a price tag. As legal systems differ this aspect can 
be presented only in very general terms,70 and even then does not exclude that some 
legal systems may see it differently.  
The basic rule is that a legal unilateral intervention in existing rights does not warrant 
financial compensation for individual losses of wealth. In this general sense the general 
interest has priority over private interests (and government may be efficient),71 but of 
course such interventions are allowed only if indeed aimed exclusively at serving a public 
interest – which also implies that in principle they are addressed to abstract categories of 
citizens (including of course, firms/providers) and hence apply to all individual members 
of such a category equally. In as far as citizens share in the public interest; they will be 
favoured by this interference.72 Otherwise, as to non-concurring private interests, there 
may be a burden. This will be compensated for only in two general, yet specific cases of 
inequality; that of incalculable and disproportionate risk (see no. 40) and that of specially 
protected rights (see no. 41). 
 
40. Firstly, the circumstance of inequality, concerning a burden due to an incalculable 
and disproportionate risk. Many government interferences are calculable risks. A provider 
making use of an infrastructure owned by government, may deduce from a positive legal 
                                                
67 These are not only independent regulatory agencies, but also (other) decentralised government bodies of 
which legislative or regulatory powers depend on decisions of the supreme legislator (below constitutional 
legislation). 
68 For example in introducing new taxes. Consider also the ‘back-door option’ where limitations or requirements 
are formulated in (policy) rules concerning supervision and sanctioning. PM Furthermore, there may be cases 
were a constitution directly attributes regulatory powers to regulators. Finally, in the Twence case the aspect of 
competence is relevant as municipalities have no competence for creating their own public interest enterprise 
regime. 
69 The following bypasses matters of (other, especially more formal) principles of proper administration; such as 
careful preparation of an administrative act and providing for citizens to be heard. 
70 And is in need of further comparative research! 
71 Not being required to negotiate with each citizen involved or have to compensate each citizen who is 
burdened. 
72 As when government introduces environmental restrictions: the general environmental interest will often 
partially concur with individual environmental interests. 
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indication of a task or responsibility for its upkeep that at some point government may 
have to temporarily shut down services for reasons of maintenance work. Often, 
however, government interventions are the result of an unforeseen or, as to its 
specificities, even unforeseeable risk, as the result of adherence to new public values or 
to a fundamentally new view on how to pursue (or translate) an already acknowledged 
public value (into new enunciations as criteria for public services). If the latter is the 
case, then interference leads to a duty to compensate if there is disproportionality in how 
the burden of this intervention is shared. If one or merely a few citizens (and firms) carry 
(most) of the burden for the benefit of all (as it is the general interest that is served), 
then compensation to the extent of the disproportionality is to be provided for.73 If public 
service lies in the hands of several private providers, a government intervention to, in 
short, enhance this service may escape the obligation of compensation (on these 
grounds) – as the burden is shared amongst all that are involved as providers. If the 
number of provided is limited (to 1 or 2) or if, with a larger number of providers, some 
providers are hurt substantially more because of other (substantial activities that are 
jeopardised, than the need for compensation may come into play.74 
 
41. Secondly, inequality concerning a burden in specially protected rights. In effect this 
category amounts to the obligation of compensation in cases where the criteria of risk 
and proportionateness are substituted by the requirement of (an occurrence of) rights 
that are socially or societally considered of such importance that infringement needs to 
be compensated (fully).75 In short two subcategories should be named: 
• property rights, as ownership is protected in two senses:76  
a. (explicit) expropriation of a property as government seizes property under the 
doctrine of eminent domain (with well known examples under spatial planning, but, 
concerning public services also seizure of the ownership of (vital) infrastructures).77 
Sometimes these acts follow a war or revolutionary upheaval in society78 or a near 
bankruptcy in the (industrial) services involved – so either the legal safeguards 
temporarily do not apply or the private shareholders involved have little to no value 
to seek compensation for.79 A government seizure of ownership of an infrastructure 
may be a form of reverse privatisation or publitisation, for strategic economic 
reasons, closely linked to public values such as ‘continuity’.80 Generally compensation 
to the full is considered appropriate and procedurally compensation is arranged for 
before ownership is transferred.81 
b. (implicit) ‘regulatory takings’ as government introduces regulations that, although 
not with the aim of expropriation, limit the use of property as such that effectively the 
owner feels he has lost control to the extent that is comparable to being compulsorily 
                                                
73 This doctrine is generally known as ‘(in)égalité devant les charges publiques’ ((in)equality in the face of the 
public burden). PM 
74 As this is a general analyses to pursue definite conclusions is useless. 
75 Protection of these rights is in itself a public value.  
76 The distinction made may seem somewhat artificial as in some legal systems both subcategories are 
considered as one doctrine. Furthermore the sub b. category may, in some systems touch upon or blend in with 
the category as discussed above. 
77 Cases where government seizes property of a, formerly open access, such as the electromagnetic spectrum, 
lie outside this scope (and as to compensation fall under the already discussed category). See: A Property 
System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, by Arthur 
S. de Vany; Ross D. Eckert; Charles J. Meyers; Donald J. O'Hara; Richard C. Scott, Stanford Law Review © 
1969, p. 1499-1561. The compensation for nationalisation requires further research. 
78 Notably (former) communist regimes, were compensation was considered unnecessary as private property 
ceased to exist, but also, for example, post Second World War nationalisation of Renault by the French State (in 
response to collaboration with the German occupant). PM  
79 Compare the British Leyland Motor Company case. PM 
80 Possibly refer to the 2001 British Railtrack case (after liquidation; introduction in 2002 by state dominated 
Network Rail – not for dividend company that owns and operates the British railway infrastructure). PM 
81 ‘Direct condemnation’ instead of ‘inverse condemnation’. PM  Also compare, in respect of international 
relations and investments, the 1962 UN Resolution 1803, concerning Permanent Sovereignty over National 
Resources, which holds that in the event of nationalisation,  the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, 
by the state, in accordance with international law (which need not be full compensation as some – developing – 
countries may find themselves unable to do so). PM  
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disowned (as in the above).82 In short a general criterion to determine a taking is 
whether or not the private owner can still use his or her property right profitably or 
whether there is still room for a ‘reasonable beneficial use’.83 If the regulatory 
restrictions are in breach of (one of) these criteria, then compensation is in place.84 
Introducing a new tax, as was suggested in the Housing corporations case, may 
under certain conditions be regarded as an example of a taking – or perhaps even of 
expropriation. Clearly the precise impact, in terms of whether the delivery of services 
remains an economically viable option,85 will be an important factor in judging upon 
the need or amount of compensation.86 
Consider, regarding both a. and b., that one or more providers of a public service 
may make use of a state owned infrastructure. Apart from ‘imperial’ legislation or 
regulation, underpinned by parliamentary sovereignty or the like, this state property 
provides a title of ‘dominion’87 to introduce restrictions (having effect on the cost-
effectiveness of) public services delivered through this network. Different legal 
systems present different views on normative aspects of such a mechanism. Some 
consider the ‘id quod’ in terms of the above question of whether dominium is used to 
escape from safeguards attached to imperial powers, and some hold conditions as to 
the kind of ‘dominion’ regulation that is allowed: only restricted in as far as is strictly 
necessary considering the prime use of the infrastructure. Furthermore, the ‘modus 
quo’ or way in which such dominion powers are exercised may be subject to public 
law restrictions and hence limitations as the above may again surface.  
• (other) individual rights of non interference, again in two types of cases: 
a. cases in which government has explicitly guaranteed (in the course of 
privatisation) that certain private interests (in assets) would be protected, thus 
ensuring that private parties are willing to invest. Such a provision could be part of a 
legislative arrangement or of the conditions under which privatisation took place.88  
b. cases where implicitly non interference or a promise thereof may be assumed, 
considering the nature of a legal arrangement, as in specific procurement/tender 
cases, where private parties have a only short term to make a profit and/or where 
making profits is very dependent on the set conditions (almost as in discrete 
contracts) or investments are risky and/or considerable.  
Consider, both concerning a. and b., the case of a tender procedure for public 
transport. Possibilities for ex ante or ex post provisions concerning discrepancies will 
be subject to rights and duties, powers and privileges embedded in definitions and 
conditions of the procurement/tender procedure, whether more general or more 
specific, and possibly both as written and unwritten rules (also regarding subsequent 
granting of a concession or permit and civil law rules for transport contracting). In 
this tightly woven fabric of commitments, obligations and responsibilities, the 
freedom to unilaterally intervene on behalf of public values is likely to be subject of 
legal scrutiny, in search of explicit and implicit limitations.89 
                                                
82 Especially known as the US doctrine, pertaining an infringement of the 5th Amendment: ‘Nor shall individual 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.’ 
83 See Needham, Planning, Law and Economics, An investigation of the rules we make for using land, Routledge 
London/New York, 2006, p. 46-48 (and –PM- Paul, E.F. (1987) Property rights and Eminent Domain, New 
Brunswick NJ, Transaction books). Also PM – research on Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 393 (1922): government purportedly wanted to regulate the subject property, but the severity of 
regulation made the intervention go "too far" by depriving the owner of the property's value, utility or 
marketability, denying him or her the benefits of property ownership thus accomplishing a constitutionally 
forbidden de facto taking without compensation. 
84 As said in an earlier footnote (supra, nr. 76), in elaboration on this point in some systems the criteria may 
merge with those Eminent Domain (with full compensation as a rule) and in others with disproportionate 
burden due to an incalculable.  
85 And when the tax is specifically aimed at one provider, this may alternatively bring this matter under the 
above égalité-doctrine. 
86 Note that to scrap an earlier tax-exemption (as in the case of the housing corporations) may be hurtful but 
may, dependent on the specific circumstance of the case, be considered less damaging – as the private party 
has already ‘cashed’ an perhaps need only be compensated by a transitional period. 
87 From the Latin ‘dominium’. 
88 For now, this is a theoretical concept – the search for examples still has to take place. 
89 This point needs precise underpinning with cases - PM. 
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42. The (jural) opposite to the immediately above a. and b., is to assume that the mere 
existence of a special regime for a public service, may be taken to implicitly provide 
government with a legal title to introduce alterations or restrictions regarding the public 
service involved on grounds relating to its understanding of and desire to protect or 
enhance the public values or its translation into enunciations pertaining to that service. 
This argument of ‘implied powers’, however, passes over the fact that the privatisation as 
a normative transformation has activated a new set of rules, and legally protected 
interests within a civil law framework – with distinctive barriers with regard to 
governmental intrusion, which essentially create the setting in which private providers 
may have a willingness to deliver.  
To assume implicit powers, however, is to assume the presence of a coherent normative 
system in which implied powers naturally appear as necessary and proper devices to the 
realisation of underlying values; devices that, had existing circumstances have been fully 
thought through, had most likely been introduced explicitly. For government call on 
systemic responsibility to underpin implicit powers is a far cry from such a normative 
context, especially as privatisation is introduced to explicitly distance (if not disconnect) 
the public service from the desired public value in the sense that to providers and to 
costumers it is subject to transactions on the basis of ‘reciprocal’ private interests 
(translation into enunciations of service is one-sided). Hence the normative integrity is 
absent or exists only on either side of the barrier between the public and the private. At 
best, a special regime for public services may entail inherent powers, powers connected 
to express power in the sense that without these the express powers loose their 
meaning. Even so, to assume that such power may be relied upon to avoid the 
transaction costs of unlocking property rights, i.e. offering compensation, seems unlikely 
at best.90 
In contrast, a more likely consequence of a special regime for delivery of a public service 
may be that government is more limited in its powers to unilaterally redress 
discrepancies, as was indicated in fine under no. 41.    
 
43. Finally, ‘as to b.’ (interference in incentives). Any unilateral intervention by 
government in the workings of privatised rendering of public services stands a chance of 
infringing on the effectiveness of the privatisation scheme. Whether to interfere in the 
symmetry of contracts (for example by introducing special safeguards to protect the 
costumer) or in residual claims or presumptive rights (for example by taxation or post 
hoc limitations to the (unforeseen) use of new technological possibilities) may and often 
will have effect on the private law incentives that were meant to enhance efficiency (and 
quality) in the delivery of public services. With each intervention the question will have to 
be answered whether it will affect the effectiveness of these incentives, and if a negative 
influence is expected, whether the marginal benefit for the underlying public value 
overrides the marginal cost on privatised operations’ efficiency. In effect the question is 
whether these government interventions are in fact the kind of interferences that ‘we, as 
a government, were planning not to employ anymore.’ The examples of CEO-salaries or 
the treat of taxation of corporations are typical of interfering in incentive structures.  
Although this issue seems relevant only in terms of the efficiency of the governance 
structure – as it falls under the ‘public organisation’ aspect – it should be remembered 
that legal systems may also hold general provisions meant to provide for protection of 
‘the free market’, as this is considered the most appropriate and hence default 
governance system for transactions concerning respectively delivery of goods and 
services. Furthermore, in the context of supranational co-operation, such as in the 
European Community (EC),91 the concept of an ‘internal market’ is regarded as 
                                                
90 PM on implied and inherent powers. M.A. Heldeweg, Ongeschreven rechtsbeginselen en geïmpliceerde 
bevoegdheden als opmaat voor een autonoom bestuursrecht?, In: Koning, H. en E.M.J. Crombag (red.), De 
autonomie van het bestuursrecht, 2001, Boom Juridisch, p. 11-55. 
91 For the non-lawyer: presently the EC (next to Euratom) is the supranational ‘pillar’ within the EU (European 
Union) framework (that also encompasses two inter-governmental pillars). Once the Lisbon-Reform Treaty (as 
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indispensable in the achievement of an ‘ever closer union’.92 Hence safeguards may be, 
and within the EC have been introduced to overcome and prohibit barriers to the free 
flow or exchange of capital, workforce, and services. The EC-Treaty holds general free 
trade provisions, such as to prevent the occurrence of cartels (see Article 81 EC-T), but 
also, for example, rules concerning state aid (Article 86) or special conditions concerning 
(the possibility of designating certain companies as) Enterprises of General Interest. 
Especially the latter and the Treaty provisions on protecting the free flow of capital (in 
Article 56 EC-T) are important when a government wishes to retain control over private 
companies.93 If governments want to redress discrepancies (ex ante or ex post), they 
have to reckon with the fact that the services involved may be regarded as provided for 
by private companies and market transactions and that interventions need be ‘market-
conform’.  
 
44. All of the above (no’s 34-43), even though sketchy for reasons of generalisation, 
amounts to support the hypothesis that the normative transformation causes a legal 
lock-in which in turn leads to an increase in government legal (and most likely monetary) 
transaction costs with regard to amending (privatisation) discrepancies by a unilateral 
regulatory intervention. These are transaction costs for unlocking, as private parties 
under privatisation hold legal interests embedded in the new privatised legal context; 
interests that are protected by law concerning competences, expropriation, special rights, 
takings, égalité and as such protecting the free-market, amounting to requirements in 
terms of due cause, due procedure and (possibly) proper compensation. 
 
 
V. Regulatory and property considerations  
 
45. If government fully intends to continue the privatised regime, regulatory options (in 
the face of discrepancies) for safeguarding new aspects of public services or legal 
conditions for delivery thereof are limited. A ‘regulatory fix’, whereby government has full 
discretion to ex post unilaterally94 redefine the public quality or public performance of 
services,95 would indeed legally amount to republitisation (or reverse privatisation) – 
a.k.a. regulatory taking or expropriation. Effectively public property would be restored as 
private residual claims or presumptive rights would be at the grace of government, and 
contractual relations between provider and costumer would be established in the shadow 
of potential governmental intervention. 
Clearly, such as state of affairs would conflict with legal restrictions as presented in the 
above, but also with the essential systemic choice for privatisation, in terms of a 
government withdrawal to systemic responsibility and the primacy of market incentives. 
 
46. In short, there is no ‘regulatory fix’ for discrepancies as the suggestion of a fix as 
was possible within the publitised state of affairs, is that of strong public regulatory 
control. But strong public control often came with weak incentives, and hence was traded 
in for strong private incentives and a loss of public control; to regain control will be 
restricted or costly to uphold private incentives. If, in the face of (feared) discrepancies, 
that consequence is not accepted, the choice is simple: a return to the regulatory fix of 
the public realm – amounting to republitisation (at a cost)96 - or a continuation under 
privatised realm, accepting at best a accommodated regulatory approach, whereby 
                                                                                                                                                   
a substitute to the earlier ‘European constitution’) is signed (in December 2007) and ratified (in 2008) there will 
be only (one) supranational EU. 
92 PM 
93 See also the recent decision of the European Court of Justice in the Volkswagen case (on legal protection of 
government influence) http://www.curia.europa.eu/en/actu/communiques/cp07/aff/cp070074en.pdf  C-112/05, 
23 October 2007. 
94 Multilateral regulation is a theoretical option (see 9.) but will entail co-regulation and questions as to 
government’s primacy over the definition of public values – or as to the legitimacy of possible redefinitions. 
95 Not solving incompleteness as such, but the existing apparent problem of it, as it is fully capable of 
remediation. 
96 Of compensations and of the loss of all that was invested in the privatised structure. 
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regulatory (and other) instruments are chosen so as to fit best with privatisation – also 
entailing a marginal analysis (see no. 43). 
 
47. So the quest is directed towards ex ante and/or ex post avoidance or remediation of 
discrepancies, in respect of privatisation. The proper approach to this will, in practise, 
have to be determined in view of contextual variables, such as the nature of the services, 
of the enunciations for quality and performance, of the parties involved, and of other 
relevant contingency factors,97 as these variables may well influence the risk of 
discrepancies and the ability and willingness to change the existing modus operandi. 
Comparing options for remediation, in the light of contextual variables, goes beyond the 
scope of this paper. What it can offer is a set of general options along the lines of 
willingness to respond to discrepancies optimistically or pessimistically, as in: 
a. ex ante opting for ruling incompleteness out entirely; 
b. ex ante hoping for the best and not taking safeguards for if and when ex post 
discrepancies do arise (note that a may amount to b); 
c. ex ante arranging for the best possible (institutional) mechanisms, respecting 
privatisation, to address ex post discrepancies (note that a may combine with c).  
 
48. Before presenting these options (as a pattern card to chose from; considering the 
aforementioned contextual variables), one preliminary matter remains. In the 
Introduction of this paper, it was suggested (in no. 2) that a ‘property fix’ could be the 
alternative to a ‘regulatory fix’. As we have just discussed how a ‘regulatory fix’ is 
bounced off by the systemic choice for privatisation, the question may be raised if the 
property fix is indeed an alternative. 
From the above, however, scepticism on this option is in place. If unilateral control 
through regulation is a possible threat to privatisation, all the more reason to assume 
that governmental property rights will share in that appreciation. For government to own 
considerable property rights in a private provider, is indeed in principle incompatible with 
privatisation – as this is about government discarding property.  
To retain hold of substantial property rights in privatised providers, so as to maintain 
control over its operations, and effectively be able to prevent or correct any discrepancy 
is in effect a ‘publitised’ state of affairs. At least, if the government property position is to 
be understood as aptitude to control similar to government’s regulatory objective of 
serving public values. We should, however, consider that to hold property in a privatised 
provider may be about more than control only, or that control may be understood in 
different ways.  
 
49. Government property in privatised providers may alternatively serve:98 
a. to actively influence substantive decision making, in the sense of not only strategic, 
but also operational decisions. This would only be possible if shares provide strong 
management influence, especially through appointment of managers. Especially if 
government is also one of a provider’s main costumers (as in, for example, waste 
disposal),99 then an entanglement or blending of ‘roles’, concerning operational 
issues, should not surprise. Even minor discrepancies could be addressed through this 
type of bundled ‘control’. 
b. to passively influence substantive decision making, in the sense of ‘merely’ 
influencing strategic decisions on mission, major organisational and labour matters, 
choice of markets, major bids, et cetera, especially through appointment of governors 
                                                
97  Such as political and social climate (trust; civil society), the state of the economy and the aptitude to 
(technologically) innovate. 
98 Provide general source for this categorisation. PM Compare White paper on government participation in 
private companies Nota Deelnemingenbeleid rijksoverheid 2002, (Parliamentary documents (Tweede Kamer), 
2001-2002, 28165, nrs. 1-2). 
99 At the University of Twente, presently M.L. van Genugten is finalising her PhD. thesis on the discriminating 
alignment hypothesis applied to public services, using waste disposal cases as empirical illustration. This 
example is derived from her information from some of these cases.  
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(who in turn appoint and control managers). Again, it may be assumed that this 
offers some form of ‘control’, but minor discrepancies will stay out of focus.100 
c. to keep out others or ensure the company’s continuity (in the country where the 
government share holder resides). Here the aim is arrange for a protective shield 
against dangers that may jeopardise the continued delivery of public services. To 
avoid a hostile take-over or ensure the company’s economic vitality and sense of 
place (although this matter touches on option b.) a very passive presence as a share 
holder may suffice. Needless to say that in such a case avoidance of or overcoming 
discrepancies is left to regulatory interventions.  
d. to make money. Government may hold shares simply because is sees possibilities to 
make a profit through dividend or shareholder value (when shares are sold at a later 
date). Clearly, this aim falls outside the scope of discrepancies (apart from it that the 
shares may be held in companies that are not involved in public services. This option 
may be considered unfitting for government.101  
e. as a remains of large investments. Especially in cases of network providers, the 
existence of government shares in the provider may be a consequence of the need of 
prior infrastructural investments, which at some stage, when (sunk) investment costs 
have been retrieved as much as possible, and share prices are good, will be sold off. 
Often though, management of the infrastructure and providing for services will be 
separated, and only shares in the private provider are sold off (unless a-d apply). 
Infrastructures may be kept in government possession as strategic positions (possibly 
as in c.), also ensuring that the network itself will remain a ‘market place’, accessible 
only through tenders & concessions, permits or other mechanisms, but guaranteeing 
that the connected services will be continued. In the latter case discrepancies may be 
addressed by the dominion powers vested in the infrastructure,102 in case of mere 
remains of sunk costs, addressing discrepancies will fall outside government scope, 
certainly as shares are sold of or only mere remnants remain.  
f. all of the above as a temporary circumstance, with intent of enabling a public service 
or otherwise desirable activity to be initiated (in circumstances as the above 
infrastructural costs or otherwise considered to high a risk for the private initiative 
only) or in the transitory stages of privatisation, to retain control, ultimately as an 
emergency brake to safeguard public values. In effect the latter arrangement 
amounts to a property fix, as temporary quasi-privatisation; with the danger of 
extended duration, as in the Schiphol and Twence(?) cases, which ultimately fall 
outside the scope of privatisation. 
 
50. These six options categorise a variety in government property involvement, whether 
or not enshrined in legislation. In practise options may overflow, blend or mix, as legal 
constructs often defy imagination, for instance through a multi-layered structure of 
organisations and enterprises. On an even level, a crossover may be found where 
strategic option b. is employed so reticently that it effectively amounts to (influence on) 
sacking and appointing governors only, and only in circumstances where this is 
considered necessary as an emergency brake because services are in serious 
disrepute.103 
                                                
100 Which should not be a major concern as these will probably be least difficult to tackle otherwise – that is, 
through regulation.  
101 Ideologically or because these investments involve major risks and such risks should not be taken at the 
possible expense of the taxpayer. Compare the Ceteco-affair in the Netherlands, were one of the Dutch 
provinces lost considerable amounts of money in share value, which lead to the Dencentralised government 
finances act (Wet financiering decentrale overheden (Wet fido), setting new rules for treasury management. 
http://www.minbzk.nl/onderwerpen/openbaar-bestuur/financien-provincies/financiele-functie/financiering .  
102 As such providing an alternative to the use of (a., b. and) c. with regard to the private provider(s). Mind the 
restrictions formulated in no. 41. 
103 For example in the Dutch NS case of January 2nd 2002, when the minister of traffic and transport requested 
of ‘her’ governors in the Dutch railroad enterprise, NS, to sack the incumbent NS-director-president because of 
his responsibility for not meeting the 80% punctuality requirement (which ‘staggered’ at 79,9%!). 
http://www.ns.nl/servlet/Satellite?cid=1074533958309&pagename=www.ns.nl%2FPersbericht%2FPersberichte
nDetail&p=1071490150742&c=Persbericht (27 October 2007). 
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Of course the choice of option will relate to political views and (other) contextual 
variables, and with a specific choice of share holder position, as being a minority or 
majority share holder, or possibly (as a minority share holder) holding a golden share 
and thus maintaining control. We need to keep in mind that some of these options, 
especially concerning golden shares, may be prohibited by law.104 
 
51. So although control by which to be able to address discrepancies may not always be 
the prime consideration, often government property in private providers will (latently) 
amount to useful influence, at least in more serious discrepancy cases. As the Schiphol 
and Twence cases show the relevance of the property fix also lies in the ex ante 
prevention of discrepancies. In these cases to retain control through property rights is 
motivated also by the desire to actively enhance public interests as part of the provider’s 
mission.  
In this respect we need to be aware that in liberal democratic states regulatory options 
reflect the state versus society divide in terms of the democratic primacy over 
determination of the general interest (or over public values) versus private primacy over 
special (individual or group) interests (or over private values). Under this ideological 
divide direct (command and control) regulation may restrict citizens in their pursuit of 
private values and interests, but to command them to actively and expressly be involved 
in enhancing the general interest is not in keeping with democratic principles – setting 
aside the duty to pay taxes, or (in some countries, the duty) to vote. If citizens are 
brought into action to that avail, this amounts to the performance outside political choice, 
merely as an objective execution of clear tasks – as a (quasi-) civil servant105 (or as a 
tax-payer or member of the electorate). Alternatively, citizens and companies may be 
entertained in public interests through indirect or self regulatory arrangements – indirect 
regulation being known as promoting specific behaviour through providing economic 
incentives (such as taxes, subsidies and tradable public rights) and self regulation as 
being based on personal conviction that the desired behaviour is morally superior.106 
However, as subsidies (‘indirect’) or private certification (‘self’) may certainly enhance 
public interests, we need to be aware of two major constraints: 
• both regulatory options operate only on a voluntary basis.107 Under indirect 
regulation, citizens and firms have an option to choose the undesired (and 
economically less efficient or advantageous) behavioural option; self regulation has 
voluntarism at its very core. Hence the public values under such scheme stand a 
chance of not expressly or implicitly being served, as providers may decide to choose 
different options;  
• should this be different then we need remember that the involvement in promoting 
public values is subject of a translation of these values in private interests or 
technically specified obligations, as is the case under indirect regulation, or, under 
self regulation, so that the parties involved are often not compelled to the course of 
action to which they have proclaimed to be committed.108  
 
52. Pointing at these constraints is not to proclaim them (inherently) invalid, as they 
may play an important role in the pursuit of public values, but their particular 
characteristics may explain government use of property rights in private providers of 
public services, so as to ensure active involvement in underlying public values. Through 
participation in Schiphol or Twence, government can direct their mission statements to 
                                                
104 Considering its influence on the free flow of capital: a golden share will keep private investors out and thus 
hampers the free flow of capital (other than on the basis of actually holding a majority of shares). 
105 Objective in the sense of on the basis of functional and professional criteria. Quasi-public servants may be 
found in privatisation of the exercise of granting public law rights (such as certificates, and permits).  
106 PM  
107 The above reference to civil servants may be related to this point, as regulations for civil servants do not 
compel to work for government , except for when this states is forced upon a person as in compulsory military 
service… 
108 Under covenants, parties may bind themselves horizontally, such as companies in a particular branch of 
industry. When government is involved there seldom are vertical sanctions to a breach of covenant, at least 
non other then the threat of unilateral legislation. 
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include, for example, promoting sustainability or employing green-initiatives, such as in 
lower airport tariffs for cleaner planes or using incineration warmth for urban heating 
projects. As regulatory options can not (directly) or may not (through indirect or self 
regulation) trigger these initiatives government property may provide the ‘fix’. Then 
again, form the viewpoint of this paper, in the end these cases are the least interesting 
as the problem of discrepancy is less likely to occur, with government steering the 
provider’s activities.  
 
53. So both regulation and property rights are only compatible with privatisation in 
moderation, attuned to privatisation as a choice of principle. Even though we know that 
the world is full of ‘hybrids’, if only for analytical clarity, now we will look into some basic 
remedial options to discrepancy, given privatisation.  
 
 
VI. Options addressing discrepancy problems  
 
54. In no. 47 it was suggested that options to address discrepancies along the lines of 
willingness to respond to discrepancies optimistically or pessimistically, according to: 
a. ex ante opting for ruling incompleteness out entirely; 
b. ex ante hoping for the best and not taking safeguards for if and when ex post 
discrepancies do arise (note that a. may amount to b.); 
c. ex ante arranging for the best possible institutional mechanisms, respecting 
privatisation, to address ex post discrepancies (note that a. may combine with c).  
We will first elaborate on these options, of which a. and b. may also be found 
‘opportunist’, and c. ‘institutionalist’. The ordering will be slightly amended, placing a. 
under ‘purely ex ante’ (as the possibility of ex post problems is to be eradicated or 
excluded), c. as ‘ex ante arranging for ex post problems’ (as the latter are considered 
inevitable), and finally b. as ‘purely ex post’, as nothing is done ex ante to prevent 
discrepancies or to lower the burden of ex post having to address any of these. 
 
55. The option of treating the problem ‘purely ex ante’, aiming for a complete 
‘translation’, by trying to eradicate or exclude (the chance at) incompleteness. Under this 
heading we may point at three possible actions:  
a. aim for complete determination 
With regard to some public values – public services translations, government may 
assume that enunciations can be complete (for instance by pure technical/numerical 
definitions) and stable (as closed texture; with no likelihood of new political or social 
demands) and hence the problem of discrepancies will not arise. It remains to be 
seen whether this option is in fact naïve, as in principle all public values/services may 
be prone to reconsideration at some point in time. On the other hand, some public 
values/services will have undergone relatively fewer changes over the last years or 
decades than others, and their descriptive characteristics may be more technical by 
nature, and hence this option may within reason be entertained, especially as 
institutional safeguards, as discussed under no. 56, may entail transaction costs that 
on marginal analysis are not or less cost-effective than aiming for completeness.109 
A similar cost-effectiveness analysis may lead to not even bother to ex ante try and 
define a public value/service completely because the cost of reaching completeness 
probably will not outweigh the cost of ex post remediation of discrepancies – a 
conclusion that may even apply to very wicked and dynamic public values/services.110 
Alternatively, in practice a middle ground may be sought combining an effort at 
complete determination and the hope or assumption that, should a discrepancy arise, 
the costs of remediation will be limited, and hence the issue may be left to purely ex 
post response, as in 57a. and 57b.111 
b. fully hive off services to the ‘free market’  
                                                
109 A search into possible examples is underway… PM 
110 Compare the analysis on cost-effectiveness regarding the problem of incomplete contracts. PM 
111 See footnote 109. 
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Admittedly an option that falls outside our scope, but is named as it could be a 
reasonable response to a wicked problem of incompleteness. If, given the nature or 
dynamics of a public value/service, not only complete determination could prove 
impossible but hesitance also creeps up in view of costs concerning attempts at 
institutionalisation or costs of merely responding to discrepancies ex post, then this 
option comes into play. The answer could then be that privatisation is to be taken to 
the extreme in that the matter fully becomes an issue of the ‘free market’. 
Government involvement will then be limited to fair trade, and not to ensuring 
continuity of service or otherwise protecting or enhancing the public value/service – 
as the ‘volatility’ of the latter requires a market type of allocative coordination rather 
then one through a politico-administrative, hierarchical governance structure. 
Naturally, for this conclusion to be drawn, apart from politico-legal considerations (for 
instance with regard to distributive justice), the costs of the options to address 
discrepancies will have to be weighed against the total costs of the service as such.  
Furthermore, a problem of this nature may give rise to other options such as not 
privatising (or not to the extent that is researched here- so leaving open major 
property rights of government in providing the service and effective and efficient 
control over discrepancies), and the option of a fundamental conversion or 
transformation of the public value itself or of its translation in (enunciations of) a 
public service. Perhaps volatility in the determination of a values or service is an 
indicator for not having found the proper level of definition of the interest at stake.112 
c. full and active dominion control over the private provider 
This option also, as the afore (under 55b.), falls outside the scope of this paper, but 
now because it leans on majority share holder control (through a majority of shares 
or a golden share providing a majority influence in decision making) as a means to 
(also) avoid incompleteness, as with this (operational) control over the private 
provider, discrepancies can be adequately addressed before or as they occur – but 
clearly such control reflects a state of affairs which may, at best, be described as 
quasi-privatisation.113 
 
56. The option of ex ante providing for ex post interventions, departs from the 
assumption that in most cases incompleteness is inevitable and that in most of these 
cases it is comparatively more cost-effective114 and/or preferable to the efficiency of the 
privatised governance structure115 and/or to legal principles such as legal certainty (in 
the protection of property and other rights),116 to institutionally provide for mechanisms 
to guide the adjustments necessary to remediate a discrepancy. The three options which 
seem most fitting are: 
a. to periodically republitise and reprivatise 
This approach amounts to a temporary suspension of privatisation and is well known 
in tender procedures amounting in a competition for the market on public services 
such as  public transport (regionally or nationally), (certain types of) health care, and 
labour re-integration or employment agencies. In fact, in this option government 
periodically republitises the property rights concerned, only to reprivatise them again 
on the basis of new definitions and new bids.  
This option aims at institutionalisation by incorporating the need for adjustments in 
the privatised governance structure. It may be positioned between the discrete public 
                                                
112 Somewhat artificially it may be said that to define the public value of children being able to have access to 
TV-entertainment, and to have this arranged by a separate tender, is probably less efficient than to address 
this issue in terms of the peoples right to access to TV (regardless of further specification of a target group and 
specific kinds of programmes). At the same time this example may also support the hiving off option (perhaps 
leaving open the public value of sufficient access to information in emergencies).. PM. 
113 To research this option as against the regulatory fix option remains a personal point of interest for a next 
contribution on the topic of reverse privatization. 
114 Considering transaction costs of the purely ex ante or purely ex post options (no. 55 and 57). 
115 Considering possible impact of remediable activities on trust in the structure: private incentives may become 
less effective out of fear for government interference. 
116 From a legal standpoint to uphold protection of property or of other legal interests as a value in itself, to be 
appreciated more than is reflected in the possibility of financial compensation of infringements (under which 
these values are regarded merely as economic assets). 
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private contract, where there is an immediate exchange of payment by government 
and service by a private provider to (a third party indicated by) government,117 and 
the indefinite privatisation, where discrepancies are addressed on an ad hoc basis – 
i.e. as they present themselves. Effectively this option amounts to institutionalising 
and internalising costs, as periodical re-privatisation will be a costly legal mechanism, 
not in terms of compensating loss of private (residual) property rights (as these are 
only temporary), but because of periodically having to recalibrate the enunciation of 
‘proper delivery’ of services; in response to possible changes in (value-)demands and 
in technological opportunities. Subsequent inviting, judging and comparing new bids 
to the tender, and drawing up new contracts (and dealing with legal procedures by 
those who lost), will also involve costs.  Furthermore, there may be losses in terms of 
job certainty or production facilities that may, after reprivatisation, prove too asset 
specific or otherwise unsuited to be re-employed. Finally, periodical republitisation 
may seriously reduce the effectiveness of private incentives. To balance the length of 
the period for contracting out between ‘not too long to avoid discrepancies’ (from 
becoming unacceptable), and ‘long enough to provide for an economically sound (i.e. 
profitable) investment’, is most important but may well prove to be very difficult. 
Tender procedures may prove adequate mechanisms to deal with discrepancies, but 
as an instrument tendering is also – and perhaps especially - considered useful to 
other means, such as getting the cheapest or most efficient service,118 given certain 
quality or performance demands and ensuring that governments create a level 
playing field amongst candidates to provide a service. These objectives will have to 
be weighed against the aspect of dealing with discrepancies. Finally, within tendering 
as a legal instrument, there is a variety of mechanisms, for instance concerning 
acceptance of a bid(der), selection of bid(ders), conditionality of a tender contract 
and enforcement. These variable characteristics can not be addressed here but may 
well affect the usefulness of this instrument in terms of remediation of discrepancies. 
b. to explicitly arrange for a re-regulatory competence 
In the above, the aspect of the competence, under public or private law, to remediate 
discrepancies was presented as a possible restriction (see no. 38). To overcome such 
a problem a privatisation regime may be designed in such a fashion that it includes 
competences of government (or a supervisory agency) to address and if necessary 
remediate discrepancies. The prime objective of this would be to make interventions 
on this basis (more) immune to the rebuttal of expropriation or takings. The 
arrangement could present select criteria concerning circumstances of applicability 
(which is also in the interest of the legal certainty of the private provider).119 It could 
be extended to also comprise procedural and substantive criteria, such as arbitration, 
regard for third parties’ interests,120 a relationship with expressly articulated public 
values and/or circumscribed (types of) services and or and economic viability 
standards – such as: no new requirements that exceed the margins within which the 
provider can still make a profit,121 or pre-calculated (percentages of) compensation.  
The institutional remedy suggested here goes beyond problems of ‘vagueness’. These 
are often resolved through a complaint or enforcement measure taken by a 
supervisor and, if necessary in a court resolution (assuming that there is a court that 
has competence and discretion to exclusively and bindingly decide on the 
interpretation of legal terms).  
The issue here is to arrange for a competence that addresses incompleteness and 
especially dynamic discrepancies, which in effect come down to government 
adjustment by re-regulation of public quality or public performance, after 
                                                
117 Many construction or infrastructural contracts are an example – unless performance is incompletely defined 
and completion is a lengthy process and/or carry a cooperative element in them, so that in the course of 
performance discrepancies may arise. Delivery to a third party may be to provide for infrastructures or utilities 
of private providers of other services or plainly for private use (such as cable). 
118 The so-called ‘make or buy decision’ that government is faced with. 
119 And as such clarifies at what point government interference will come at a cost (or at least the burden of 
negotiations). 
120 Competitors (in the previous tender), consumers, supply-companies, citizens.  
121 Comparable to the takings criteria as mentioned in no. 41(b). 
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privatisation (outside, but possibly also inside a framework for periodical 
reprivatisation, as mentioned in the above – under 56a). Clearly again, such 
arrangements will affect willingness of private parties to step in, and some influence 
on the effectiveness of incentives may also be expected. On the other hand, 
competence criteria may also provide for more legal certainties as private providers 
know that governments may be difficult ‘partners’ once political pressure is on, and 
often they too wish to avoid a protracted legal battle on whether their property rights 
were infringed upon and if so, what compensation would be fitting. Furthermore, 
private providers are well acquainted with these types of provisions as they often use 
them in their own standard service contracts; many consumers have found to their 
disbelief, that they signed on to a service contract that entailed the provider’s 
competence to unilaterally make changes in service (deliveries) conditions….122   
Consider, finally on this option, that the competence to remediate discrepancies, may 
concern either private or public law instruments of regulation, dependent on the 
overall legal basis for government involvement: imperial (in Latin: ‘imperium’) or 
dominion. 
c. to explicitly arrange for a significant property right 
This, form the viewpoint of privatisation, is the most hybrid option, and in fact a 
moderate version of the above option 55c. Against the option of a private provider 
which through government property rights (shares) is controlled by government, we 
may position the private enterprise: 
1. which is privately owned (with majority control) but operates as a firm within a 
public service organisation. In abstract terms this resembles the supply-company 
model to public service. The public service organisation is established by public 
bodies or by private persons and has as its task to serve a particular public value 
by providing a particular public service. To this end its inner structure is organised 
as such that stake holder interests are well taken into account, thus providing the 
organisation with the necessary legitimacy in the further determination of 
enunciations to the service provided. In other words, most enunciations are 
determined within this organisation. The organisation itself has no other 
objectives than to serve the public value/service, so there is no dividend or profit 
that may be taken out on the basis of a residual claim. However, the public 
organisation may legally control a private firm which actually provides the service 
or otherwise is a supplier to the delivery of services, and this private firm is 
indeed allowed to make a profit. In terms, however, of discrepancies, the 
relationship between the public service organisation and the private firm under its 
control is of a contractual nature, in the sense that when demand changes, 
because the organisation adjusts enunciations of the public value/service, the 
supplying firm will have to adjust also or else lose out. Clearly, the public 
organisation has an interest in the continued service by the firm (not as profit for 
profit, but only with a view on the public value/service itself). Only if other firms, 
outside of the organisation’s control, offer a better price and transaction costs in 
contracting out do not exceed the difference, the picture may change. As was said 
before, this approach resembles that of the private supply-company image. 
Presently, in The Netherlands a draft legislative proposal to such a public 
organisation construct is on the table, called the Maatschappelijke Onderneming 
(literally the ‘Societal Enterprise’) , particularly meant as a new legal personality 
for hospitals, schools & universities and …..housing corporations, and with the aim 
of combining public responsibility (to stake holders) with private incentives (in the 
supplier-firm). The debate on a definitive proposal is still ongoing.123 
2. which has a majority of private share holders, also in terms of a majority private 
control, but with a strong property position of government. The latter could take 
form by a maximum of 49.9% of shares, or a golden share not amounting to a 
                                                
122 Of course consumer law holds limitations (on grounds of ‘reasonableness’ or fairness) – and this is exactly 
why this option could also be fitting to privatization arrangements.   
123 Letter by the minister of Justice, of 12th of July 2007, 5494615/07/06 on the legal form of the societal 
enterprise. This letter also holds reference to prior studies and the draft proposal. 
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majority position. Again, it should be noted that the golden share position goes 
against principles of a free market with a free flow of capital (see no. 43 – with 
reference to EC legislation. The 49.9% option may formally open the possibility of 
being outvoted by the (combined) private share holders and hence this option 
differs from option 55c, that was discarded as quasi-privatisation. If in reality the 
moderate variation to this option does allow for effective private incentives 
remains to be seen. The same may be said about the effectiveness of being able 
to address discrepancies. Perhaps the government share holder position may at 
times prove adequate to remediate such discrepancies – but influence will most 
likely be more indirect, through strategic decision making (via governors).124 
Should avoidance of discrepancies fail, than some smoothening in the possible 
burden of compensation is that in part this will translates into share holder value. 
 
57. This leaves us with the purely ex post responses, fully accepting open texture of 
public value/services, or accepting that to combat these through the options under no. 
55 and 56 will lead to transaction costs (of complete contracting or institutional 
arrangements), that may well outweigh the risk of discrepancies.125 In this equation the 
benefits of not interfering in the effectiveness of private incentives may also play a role. 
The options need not be discussed at length as the amount to accepting the limitations 
and transaction costs that come with having to unlock protected rights as enshrined in 
the privatised governance structure. So, briefly, the options are: 
a. if dominion is the basis for privatisation, such as government ownership of an 
infrastructure, to re-negotiate with the service provider on a civil law basis. This 
means that additional quality and performance requirements will reciprocally come 
with a price to pay to the provider. Furthermore, it remains to be seen if third party 
interests need to be taken into consideration.126 
b. if imperial legislation is the basis for privatisation, re-regulate unilaterally and, in 
short, accept the costs of compensation. A problem may arise if competences do not 
suffice, and of course both procedural an substantive criteria restrict the possibilities 
of remediation, apart from the costs.  
As was said under no 55b, and ab initio no. 57, both options may be less unpleasant if it 
turns out that the adjustments come without major disadvantages to the private 
provider, so compensation costs will be limited. 
If costs are considerable, mechanisms may be sought to shift the burden. Government 
may, if possible, play in to this by allowing a raise in tariffs of services, so as to lay the 
burden with the costumer. If the general interest is at stake, a subsidy or tax reduction 
may be possible, which means that the adjustment is made at the expense of the 
taxpayer – all assuming that these public-private transfers are in keeping with the rules 
on fair trade, state aid and the free flow of capital.  
c. finally, the extreme options of forcing the issue through republitisation, either 
explicitly, by nationalisation or expropriation, in the sense of seizing private property 
rights without proper compensation, or by taxation (that is, taxing the provider),   
come into the picture, if useful to gain control of the problem of the discrepancy; but 
these fall outside the scope of this paper as privatisation is ended. 
 
 
VII. Concluding remarks 
 
58. The leading question of this paper is whether there is a ‘regulatory fix’ for the 
phenomenon of discrepancies on the realisation of public values in cases of privatisation 
of public services. The path followed with the objective of answering this question 
presented us with the following findings: 
• firstly, the acknowledgement of the relevance of this question, through an illustration 
by four cases, showing ex post problems due to ad hoc discrepancies and ex ante 
                                                
124 Assuming that the share holder position is indeed used to this end – see the options under no. 49. 
125  As in risk = chance x damage. 
126 To elaborate this point goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
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hesitance to push forward in cases where privatisation was under consideration. The 
ex post discrepancies showed that a mix of regulatory and property fixes were sought 
to address the problem – sometimes under considerable political stress. The ex ante 
fears for discrepancies lead to a hesitance and even an explicit decision not to 
privatise – at least not in terms of giving up on a majority share holder position. 
• secondly, from a more philosophical standpoint, in reference to Waismann’s theory on 
porosity, presented us with an acknowledgement of the unavoidability of 
incompleteness of enunciations in the public values – public service translation. 
• thirdly, a categorisation was presented of relevant public values/services aspects as 
the possible subjects of incompleteness. 
• subsequently (and fourthly) the privatisation decision was placed in the context of its 
normative consequences. Privatisation amounts to a normative transformation, 
causing a normative lock-in, resulting in limitations and transaction costs for 
‘unlocking’ privatisation, as government, in its attempt to avoid or overcome 
discrepancies, is confronted with some legal issues – to say nothing of the risk of 
reducing the effectiveness of private incentives through government interventions. 
• The next (and fifth) step was to assess the regulatory and property rights responses 
to the problem of discrepancies in general terms, especially in terms of 
accommodating to privatisation as a systemic choice; full regulatory or property 
control (‘fixes’) fall outside the scope of this paper, which is in part an answer to our 
leading question; the options inside this scope require an accommodated and 
moderate approach to discrepancy problems. 
• Finally, as the sixth step, options to avoid and overcome discrepancies within a 
privatised framework we presented and briefly analysed and compared. 
 
59. Considering the scope of this paper, especially the options under no. 56 address the 
problem of incompleteness without stepping outside of privatisation and going beyond 
systemic responsibility. Then again, to look beyond the rim of privatisation may lead to 
better understanding of what options we have found within the frame, hence the options 
under no. 55 and 57 were presented too. Having done this three points readily present 
themselves: 
Firstly, one may wonder if systemic responsibility allows for the type of involvement, 
which has been suggested, even under no 56. At the very least a retreat to systemic 
responsibility presupposes that minor discrepancies should be ignored and left to the 
privatised system; only discrepancies that raise serious doubts on the effectiveness of 
the whole system should be reason for government interference. Practise, however, may 
and probably will show that often political pressures will not allow government to confine 
to the pure position of systemic responsibility. 
Secondly, probably the same remark applies to the understanding of privatisation as 
such. As was suggested in the above (no. 53), the world is full of hybrids. Even within 
the privatisation options (of no. 56), government involvement on operational aspects of 
service quality and performance may be strong, and in reality these options, regardless 
of their suggested moderation in keeping with privatisation, may differ only marginally 
from options that have been described as quasi-privatisation – if we look at their effect 
on effectiveness of incentives and the reduction of transaction costs as to unlocking the 
normative transformation. 
Thirdly, regulatory or property fixes represent a type of government interference that 
analytically speaking is not in keeping with the systemic choice for privatisation (see 
supra, no. 58, fifth step). 
 
60. Clearly, in the end, cost-effectiveness analyses seems a relevant tool in choosing 
between options, apart from legal and political considerations and the aforementioned 
assessment on the effectiveness of incentives – considered in the light of contextual 
variables related to the particular public value/service and other public values related to 
the choice of instruments. In this complexity, to provide for some sort of spectrum of 
possibilities is an awkward objective. This paper was written in a more modest aim of 
offering a legal perspective on the discrepancy problem and making an attempt at more 
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clarity in options and in the barriers and the delineation of options in view of privatisation 
as a systemic choice. In doing so some options present themselves as more interesting 
than others, and hopefully this may assist in ex ante evaluations of the desirability of 
privatising. As to the relation between regulation and property, in the face of the 
manifold of privatisation concepts, further (case-)studies are required to better prepare 
privatisations, so as to prevent that in the face of discrepancies, these cases end in 
reverse privatisation and publitisation and in a lingering distrust between governments 
and markets.  
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